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The goal of this thesis is to draw attention to the often overlooked work that is done by 
activists and their networks when it comes to influencing international policy and law. The case 
study looks at the “Comfort Women” issue, an unresolved conflict from when the Japanese 
Imperial Army forced women from its colonies into sexual slavery during World War II. It is a 
fiercely debated topic throughout Asia, specifically between South Korea and Japan. Here I 
argue that not only do non-state actors have great influence over the debate and direction this 
issue takes in international forums, but that a statue placed outside of the Japanese embassy in 
Seoul, South Korea, is a major a force in and of itself in pushing the activists’ agenda for 
international recognition and support. The statues name in Korean is “Sonyeosang” [So-Neo-
Sang] and is translated to “Statue of a little girl.” I argue that the domestic politics and policies of 
countries are changed when activists networks circumvent their own governments and take their 
issue internationally, gaining the support of elites in international forums and in other countries. 
The issue is brought back around by these higher institutions affecting change in domestic policy 
and politics--the so called “boomerang effect” discussed by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. 
Adding to their theoretical framework I argue that an even greater force than the formal activist 
networks are the activists that benefit from an anarchic structure to their organizing and are not 
limited by typical political pathways or decorum. This is based in James C. Scott’s work on the 
everyday forms of resistance by the politically powerless. Here I rely on the empirical evidence I 
gathered when I filmed and embedded myself with activists protecting the statue outside of the 


















The activists’ actions are but the smallest flap of a butterfly’s  








Under the appropriate conditions, the accumulation of petty acts can, rather like snowflakes on a 
steep mountainside, set off an avalanche.  
- James C. Scott1 
 
CHAPTER ONE: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 The topic I cover in this thesis uses the theoretical framework offered by Keck and 
Sikkink in their book, Activist Beyond Borders, and applies it to answer a question, can non-state 
actors working in a decentralized network of activism manifest changes in global policy and 
law? I explore this topic theoretically, using the literature, but also empirically by using a case 
study that I believe fits this discussion very well and shows that non-state actors can indeed 
affect change. The case study is a transnational movement of human and women’s rights 
activists fighting for justice for the remaining survivors of forced sexual slavery by the Imperial 
Japanese Army during World War II. The network is mostly made up of South Korean activists, 
but has spread to many countries, especially those that were affected by Japanese colonialism 
before and during World War II.  
The activist network promoting this issue around the world uses a myriad of ways to 
wage their fight, but the most interesting and boldest form of action regards the setting up of 
statues not only in South Korea but in other countries as well.2 The statue is endearingly named 
Sonyeosang [So-neo-song] in South Korea, which means “statue of little girl”. The setting up of 
these statues is something I will focus on specifically as a means by the activists to bolster the 
narrative for their issue but also as a means to circumvent traditional political pathways and 
make ways to demand a dialogue with the Japanese government; however as activist networks 
                                                   
1 Scott, J. C. (1990). Domination and the arts of resistance: Hidden transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
192. 
2 Figure 1. 
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prove to use many tactics, the focus will shift where it needs to go. This thesis takes the the Keck 
and Sikkink methodology and goes one step further by adding in the work of James C. Scott to 
show that activists networks can operate outside of official government processes, that “everyday 
forms of resistance”3 by single members of given societies slowly add up to create a wave of 
change in domestic and international policies.  
 The first portion of this thesis will be a brief historical background on the case study and 
the introduction to research that was acquired by filming with a group of grass roots activists in 
South Korea for a whole month.4 The next portion will be a breakdown of Keck and Sikkink’s 
arguments and how the activist network here follows the path they have laid out as well as how 
the activists that were followed for the film engage in a Scott-esque resistance to the state in their 
fight over the removal of a Statue in South Korea and the installation of new statues. The 
remainder of the thesis will be a synthesis using these two schools of thought with other 
literature to flush out the larger picture.  We will see that formal organizations that engage in 
slow political processes are important in moving along and shaping policy and law but that their 
work could not be as impactful without the help of non-state actors that shun hierarchy and adopt 
an almost anarchic organizational structure, which refuses to work with traditional political 
processes but can still instigate a state response. This synthesis also fits perfectly within Keck 
and Sikkink’s theoretical framework, as they make note themselves that, “the ideas and practices 
of transnational actors fit into domestic political contexts is key to the analysis. These cases 
                                                   
3 Scott, J. C. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
4 Figure 2. 
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illustrate the difficulty of frame negotiation, where networks bring together actors with different 
normative and political agendas.”5 
 The typology used by Keck and Sikkink breaks down into four main tactics which 
activists networks use in their campaigns of persuasion, adoption, and pressure. The four tactics 
are information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. More 
than those four tactics are the four topics in which to assess the influence an activist network has. 
Those four assessments are issue creation and agenda setting, influence on states and 
international organizations, influence on institutional procedure, and influence on policy change 
in targeted actors which include states, international organizations, and private actors.6 The 
case study I have chosen runs the theoretical gamut not only for Keck and Sikkink but for James 
C. Scott as well, thus I argue here that local non-state actors and transnational activist networks, 
performing two separate types of activism, work together to induce change in the highest levels 
of international policy and law making. 
  
                                                   
5 Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics. Ithaca, 
N.Y: Cornell University Press, 38. 
6 Ibid. 25. 
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 The constant thread throughout this thesis will be the work of Keck and Sikkink, Activists 
Beyond Borders, and James C. Scott’s work of various titles. Also included among the literature 
are works spanning a number of journals covering various topics such as international law, 
human rights, social and political sciences, Asian studies, international policy and legal 
documents, and art analysis. 
 Keck and Sikkink cover a much overlooked phenomenon when considering political 
changes to policy; they bring attention to the network of activists that everyday push for social, 
political, and economic changes not only within their own borders but transnationally as well. 
They discuss the topology of an activist network, their effectiveness, and how they reach success 
through various forms of activism: control over narrative and deployment of stories, using 
leverage and accountability politics against states, and the usage of symbols and events to their 
benefit. Their framework outlines how activists, as non-state actors, are interacting with great 
success with states, international organizations, and transnational private industries they seek to 
influence.  
These actors are formed together as a networking structure, which is increasingly present 
in international politics and policy making. These networks can consist of many different types 
of actors, such as scientists and experts banded together over a shared topic, or economic actors 
and private firms seeking policy changes, and environmental or human rights activists motivated 
by principled ideas and values. These frameworks of networked do-gooders are integral to 
understanding the effectiveness and strategies of the “comfort women” movement. 
 The work of James C. Scott is mined from various books but throughout them he keeps a 
specific focus, which is on the power of the individual to resist and subvert the wills of the state 
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by using what he has termed the “weapons of the weak” which are a part of “everyday forms of 
resistance.” This display is to show that politically powerless non-state actors are not consenting 
to the state’s power or wishes. Typically viewed in the context of modernizing schemes, I 
believe his work can be applied to the actions of activists--especially activists that portray an 
anarchist bent in structure and attitude. These weapons vary but are things all can take part in 
like bad-mouthing government officials or policies, disseminating alternative narratives to that of 
the state’s, collective actions and so forth.  
More than that he discusses organizational structures for the politically powerless that are 
almost anarchic in structure, which many look down at but for these activists it suits their needs 
just fine and with results. To understand the actions and structure of the activists that I 
interviewed and followed in South Korea, Scott will be essential in illuminating their important 
position in the activist network and how their actions are but the smallest flap of a butterfly’s 
wings in South Korea but which make a typhoon in Japan. 
 Focusing on the different framings of the issue is an important conceptualization within 
the literature. In Redressing Past Human Rights Violations: Global Dimensions of Contemporary 
Social Movements, Kiyoteru Tsutsui categorizes three distinct frames, largely found in most of 
the literature, in which the activist network shapes issues. The paper is consistant with Keck and 
Sikkink’s methods. 
 The first is the women’s rights framework. Utilized by the “comfort women” movement 
at a time when discourse on women’s rights reached Korea and Japan. The movement was then 
able to contextualize their arguments in an ideological basis. The second is the human rights 
framework, a very important way to frame this issue because there is no statute of limitations 
when it comes to crimes against humanity within the international legal system. Using the human 
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rights framework internationally the activist network cleverly stopped Japan from invoking the 
1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, a treaty which Japan 
claims absolves them of all historical wrongdoings and issues regarding the Republic of Korea 
during its time as a colony.78 The third framework is Japan’s responsibility. Keck and Sikkink 
would call this the creation of the “target actor.” 
 While thinking too simplistically can be a fault at times, the literature is clear on 
identifying three main actors in the case issue discussed here. Those three actors and their 
magnet-like push and pull relationships are defined very well in Chih-Chieh Chou’s piece, An 
Emerging Transnational Movement in Women’s Human Rights: Campaign of Nongovernmental 
Organizations on “Comfort Women” Issue in East Asia.9 The author describes the three main 
actors as the “comfort women” NGOs, the Japanese government, and the United Nations. I find 
that this does not go far enough because there is a fourth actor largely invisible because of its 
anarchist organization and efforts to stay below the radar screen. This fourth actor would be the 
individual non-state actors partaking in petty acts of resistance described by James C. Scott. 
Chou helps show us inter-workings of the relationship between the NGOs and the Japanese 
government regarding the “comfort women” issue but the relationship with individual activist 
and formal organized groups needs to be flushed out much more. 
                                                   
7 AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT 
OF PROBLEMS IN REGARD TO PROPERTY AND CLAIMS AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION. (1966). 
International Legal Materials, 5(1), 111-117. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20690013 
8 Oda, S. (1967). The Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. The American Journal 
of International Law, 61(1), 35-56. doi:10.2307/2196830 
9 Chih-Chieh, C. (2003). An Emerging Transnational Movement in Women's Human Rights: Campaign of 




 The remaining literature fits into distinctive “categories” to aid the chapters throughout. 
Carmen M. Argibay10, Koji Teraya11, and Brooke Say12, flush out the historical and legal 
complications that the activist had met early on and they also provide a context for how 
international legal proceedings went forward with the “comfort women” issue which gave 
strength and legitimacy to the “comfort women” activists’ cause as well as the legal language for 
them to draw from to pressure Japan to provide reparations. 
Kelly D. Askin13, Cheah Wui Ling14, and Lee Na-Young15 all write on the actions taken 
by the “comfort women” activist network that updated their cause to better fit in with policy 
makers’ agendas in international forums and to better effect domestic government policies. This 
includes shifting the shame from the survivors to shaming the “target actor,” the Japanese 
government, as well as the deployment of human rights and women’s rights discourses, putting 
their case in an ideological and legal framework to spur actionable policies in international 
bodies. Cheah Wui Ling clarifies further the reason why some attempts to seek justice in various 
forums succeed or fail (or why somethings do not even get off the ground, like the 2015 
agreement between Japan and South Korea) which are due to two paradigms: people-based 
paradigms and state-centered paradigms. We will see when the activist network, trying to use 
                                                   
10 Argibay, C. M. (2003). Sexual Slavery and the “Comfort Women” of World War II. Berkeley Journal Of 
International Law, 21(2). 
11 Koji, T. (2013). A Consideration of the so-called Comfort Women Problem in Japan-Korea Relations: Embracing 
the Difficulties in the International Legal and Policy Debate. Journal Of East Asia & International Law, 6(1), 200. 
12 Say, B. (2005). Ripe for justice: new un tool to strengthen the position of the comfort women and to corner japan 
into its reparation responsibility. Penn State International Law Review 23(4). 
13 Askin, K. D. (2001). Comfort women – Shifting shame and stigma from victims to victimizers. International 
Criminal Law Review, 1(1/2), 5-32. doi:10.1163/15718120121002522. 
14 Cheah Wui, L. (2009). Walking the Long Road in Solidarity and Hope: A Case Study of the "Comfort Women" 
Movement's Deployment of Human Rights Discourse. Harvard Human Rights Journal, 22(1). 
15 Lee, Na-Young. (2014). The Korean Women’s Movement of Japanese Military “Comfort Women”: Navigating 
between Nationalism and Feminism. The Review of Korean Studies, 17(1). 
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foreign domestic legal systems, sometimes meets defeat because the current political zeitgeist is 
state-centered realism, whereas their cause receives more sympathy in international forums 
where people-based paradigms are in vogue. This is a phenomenon clearly described as the 
“boomerang effect” in Keck and Sikkink. 
Flushing out the above paradigms, people v.s. State, Margaret D. Stetz16 and Anna Song17 
discuss the attempts made by the activist network to work through foreign legal systems and the 
challenges they faced and why failure and success were the outcomes. Adding to this portion of 
the literature I offer my own evidence from my time spent in South Korea interviewing network 
activists and documenting their everyday forms of resistance as well as my time in San Francisco 
uncovering the activist’ work to erect a new statue there.18 I was also able to interview an activist 
working on the other side of the issue that took a lawsuit over the installing of a statue in 
Glendale, California, all the way to the supreme court (which was declined to be heard).19 
To understand the metaphysical impact of the statue and to see how the creation and 
installing of them worldwide is creating a “witness” to historical truth, past and present, I use 
Sarah Vartabedian and the interviews I conducted with the original Sonyeosang artists, Kim Eun 
Sung and Kim Seo Kyung, as well as the artist that made the San Francisco statue, Steven 
Whyte. 
Totsuka Etsuro and Sonya Kuki give actionable choices that Japan can do to reach a 
conclusion on this issue; though this is only given if both governments cooperate with each 
                                                   
16 Stetz, M. D. (2002). Representing "comfort women": activism through law & art. Iris: A Journal About Women, 
26+. Retrieved from 
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A95612702/AONE?u=cuny_ccny&sid=AONE&xid=87d5d51c, 26. 
17 Song, A. (2013). The Task of an Activist: “Imagined Communities” and the “Comfort Women” Campaigns in 
Australia. Asian Studies Review, 37(3), 381-395. doi:10.1080/10357823.2013.792783 
18 Figure 3 & 4. 
19 Accessed at http://www.latimes.com/socal/glendale-news-press/news/tn-gnp-me-comfort-statue-20170331-
story.html on April 4th, 2018. 
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other. They also show that, after activists have done their work, the international community and 




During the Battle, which lasted about fifty days, I did  not see any women at all. I knew that as a 
result of (being without access to women), men’s mental condition ends up declining, and that’s 
when I realized once again the necessity of special comfort stations. This desire is the same as 
hunger or the need to urinate, and soldiers, merely thought of comfort stations as practically the 
same as latrines. 
- Japanese Officer, 11th Army Signal Corps20 
 
CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF THE ISSUE 
In 1910, the Japanese empire annexed the Korean Peninsula with the intentions of 
territorial expansion for the empire with the added bonus of subjugating Koreans to be used in 
the ever expanding war economy.21 For a majority of this time the empire was extracting not just 
resources from the Korean peninsula to fuel its military campaigns across Asia, but also 
extracting people for much more nefarious purposes22. Forcing men into hard labor and factory 
work, the Japanese state through its military was also forcing young girls and women from its 
colonies into sexual slavery for the military. These girls, variously reported as ranging in 
numbers from 80,000 to 200,00023 (and some argue up to 500,000), from Korea, Philippines, 
Taiwan, China, Dutch, Indonesia, East Timor, and elsewhere, were first abducted or coerced 
from their villages and then sent to brothels at various Japanese military stations in Japanese-
occupied territories.2425 It is estimated that more than 80% of these women were ethnically 
Korean.26 The idea to create “comfort women” stations was in response, ironically, to the public 
outcry from the horrendous atrocities committed in Nanking, China, and other cities held by the 
                                                   
20 Yoshimi, Y., & O'Brien, S. G. (2000). Comfort women: Sexual slavery in the Japanese military during World War 
II. New York: Columbia University Press, 199. 
21 Schmidt, P. (2000). Japan's Wartime Compensation: Forced Labour. Asia-Pacific Journal On Human Rights & 
The Law, 1(2), 1-54. doi:10.1163/15718150020954796, 2 
22 Ibid. 
23 Chunghee Sarah Soh, “Human Rights and the ‘Comfort Women,’” Peace Review 12 (March 2000), 123-124. 
24 Argibary, Ibid., 378. 
25 Say, Ibid., 932. 
26 Tsutsui, K. (2006). Redressing past human rights violations: Global dimensions of contemporary social 
movements. Social Forces 85(1), 331. 
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Japanese military, “[t]hus a system was devised so that the military would have women readily 
accessible to the soldiers for sexual activity.”27 
         Victim testimonies detail the excruciating horrors these girls and women faced by 
Japanese soldiers. They were raped dozens of times a day, some had their genitals mutilated 
because of the limits of their age, others underwent forced abortions and even disembowelment 
and execution.28 At the end of the war and with the fall of the Japanese empire, the women were 
able to return to their homes—though many chose not to out of shame for what was done to 
them, a societal issue of shifting blame on to the victims instead of those responsible.29 For those 
that did return home they were met with communities embedded in strict Confucian beliefs of 
chastity which meant that it was better for them to hang their heads in shame and to keep quiet 
about their experiences than to demand any form of justice or reparations. In 1991, a Korean 
survivor, Kim Hak-sun encouraged by Korean activists, filed a class-action lawsuit against the 
Japanese government. Inspired by the growing women’s rights movement in South Korea at the 
time, she was the first survivor to tell her story and bring the issue to the public, ultimately 
raising it to an international status.30 She was the lead plaintiff in the lawsuit and died in 1997, 
never seeing her lawsuit resolved. Following her, South Korean victims were the first to come 
out to the public at large in 1991 and 1992 with what they saw as unpunished crimes against 
humanity being lost to the tides of history. 
 History does not favor Japan when one considers the facts, such as the various treaties 
that Japan was party to before fully annexing Korea for its empire. Japan was party to Article 46 
of the Hague Convention of 1907, the International Agreement for the Suppression of the “White 
                                                   
27 Askin, Ibid., 12-13. 
28 Askin, Ibid., 14, 16, 20-21. 
29 Askin, Ibid., 8. 
30 Kuki, S. (2013). THE BURDEN OF HISTORY: THE ISSUE OF "COMFORT WOMEN" AND WHAT JAPAN 
MUST DO TO MOVE FORWARD. Journal Of International Affairs, 67(1), 246-247. 
 16 
Slave Traffic” of 1904, and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in 
Women of Full Age of 1921, but these treaties run up against Japan’s denialist claims and their 
persistence that the women abducted into sexual slavery were not forced, but instead chose to do 
it.31 
 The legal defense proffered by the Japanese government is the “treaty defense,” which is 
one of many reasons they cannot find a resolution to this issue. In 1965, South Korea and Japan 
signed the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and the 
Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Korea and Japan. This treaty is pointed to by 
Japan when all wartime and colonial issues are brought up and is used as a defense where they 
can claim that all issues were resolved as soon as the ink dried. If we fast forward to August 30, 
2011, the South Korean Constitutional Court claimed that the South Korean government’s 
inactivity and inability to resolve the “comfort women” issue was unconstitutional.32 Using the 
very treaty that Japan uses as a defense, the court claimed that the South Korean government was 
obligated to find resolve for the surviving victims by filing a suit against Japan. The court used 
Article 3 of the treaty to demand that the government begin diplomatic negotiations with Japan 
and if that failed to resolve the dispute, the issue would be taken to international arbitration.33 
 The South Korean president at the time, Lee Myung-Bak, told the Japanese Prime 
Minister, Noda Yoshihiko” to settle the dispute between the victims and the Japanese 
government. Both governments dug their heels in and Japan began its first attack on the statue 
setup by activists on December 14th, 2011. Japan demanded its removal before any formal 
                                                   
31 Koji, Ibid., 200. 
32 Etsuro, T. (2013). Proposals for Japan and the ROK to Resolve the "Comfort Women" Issue: Creating trust and 
peace in light of international law. Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 11(2), 1. 
33 Ibid. 
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negotiations could begin. The non-state actors, having gotten this far through network building 
and because of the statue, were now not just seated at the table, but they had chips in the pot. 
 The above is a bird's eye historical breakdown of the case study that I plan to use 
throughout this thesis. The day that Kim Hak-sun spoke out was the day that a transnational 
activist network was born. This network has grown so large and is so well organized that its 
sphere of influence has reached organs within the United Nations and has prompted heads of 
state to chime in on the issue (most prominently, President Barack Obama of the United States 
and German Chancellor Angela Merkel). The question is, how has an issue that was 40 plus 
years dormant and almost lost to history, from a country whose population is .66% of the world, 
being talked about and debated on in the highest echelons of international policy making? The 
answer is often too simply explained, however allying with Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink as well as leaning heavily on James C. Scott’s theories, we can come to see that the true 




CHAPTER FOUR: THE STRATEGY OF ADVOCACY 
 The way that the “comfort women” movement operates is strikingly close to the 
framework that Keck and Sikkink outlined. They have broken up advocacy network’s into four 
different actions: Information Politics, Symbolic Politics, Leverage Politics, Accountability 
Politics. The point of these four action categories is to show simply how advocacy networks 
control the issue they are advocating from the local to the international level, as well as how they 
construct distinct camps for observers (the rest of civil society or neutral policy makers) to 
distinguish between the “right” side of a movement and the “wrong” side. The wrong side is 
typically a nation state or transnational private company. In the case of the “comfort women” the 
wrong side is occupied by the Japanese government and, in its own way at times, the Korean 
government. 
 Information Politics cuts two ways. Firstly information is used by activist networks to 
operate efficiently and quickly across national boundaries and also transnationally. Internal 
communications vary but are pretty common, they use email, phone calls, text messaging apps, 
social media to stay in contact with each other and to share strategies and new information.34 
And secondly activist networks “provide information that would not otherwise be available, from 
sources that might not otherwise be heard, and they must make this information comprehensible 
and useful to activists and publics who may be geographically and / or socially distant.”35 
Information is used in coordinated actions or through campaigns of persuasion targeting civil 
society or those in neutral positions to act on the issue being advocated for. 
 The “comfort women” movement relies heavily on first hand testimony from the 
remaining survivors. The issue is that these survivors are facing many health problems and are 
                                                   
34 Keck, Ibid., 18. 
35 Ibid. 
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very old, this limits access to them and access to them depends on their daily conditions. 
Currently there is just one survivor, Lee Yong Su, who is able bodied enough to make 
appearances at significant events. The activists often meet with the survivors at their shared 
home in South Korea and it is these interactions, where a retelling of their stories or their current 
wishes for action, are retold by activists through communication channels like social media, 
word of mouth, tv interviews, and so on so that the issue spreads throughout South Korea and to 
affiliate networks in other countries, such as Germany, the United States, or China. 
 These stories are important because they are the lifeblood of social movements. Just as 
important are those who tell these stories. “non-state actors gain influence by serving as alternate 
sources of information. Information flows in advocacy networks provide not only facts but 
testimony--stories told by people whose lives have been affected.”36 Activists take these stories 
and contextualize them into issues that they can frame in simple terms, right or wrong. The 
reason for this is to persuade people and governmental actors to take sides and act. What activists 
must show is that the issues being contemplated are not natural or accidental occurrences but are 
inextricably linked to a “responsible party or parties.”37 From there, activists can propose 
credible solutions found within a given system, say international law or a state’s treaty 
obligations. 
 The survivors’ ontology in South Korea is due to the forceful recruitment of women into 
sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial Army before and during World War II. Numerous 
documents and testimonies make this a difficult historical fact to deny, though the current 
Japanese government largely denies any wrongdoing. Not to muddy the waters, but it is 
                                                   
36 Keck, Ibid., 19. 
37 Ibid. 
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important to know that the South Korean government at times has been known to drag its feet 
over this issue as well.  
The last major movement by the South Korean government was an agreement between 
Japan and South Korea, called the 2015 agreement, between former president Park Guen Hye 
and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The agreement was swiftly denounced by activists and the 
survivors as it was brokered without input from the survivors and, as one activist put it when I 
was interviewing her, if they accepted the 2015 agreement, “In a way, it could even be said we 
sold them out for 1 billion yen. We couldn’t do that.”38 The Park Guen Hye regime came to an 
end when she was impeached from office on corruption charges. The 2015 agreement hit a 
stalemate between the incoming current president Moon Jae In and prime minister Shinzo Abe.  
President Moon states the deal cannot move forward because the majority of South 
Korean citizens oppose it. The activists could not let the agreement go forward because it failed 
to address what they consider reasonable solutions: an official government apology (voted on by 
the Japanese diet), reparations for the remaining survivors paid out by the government to the 
survivors directly, the teaching of this history in Japan, and the promise to stop this kind of 
atrocity from occuring in the future. After the activists successfully stalled the agreement from 
going through the issue found its way to the United Nations in March 2016, where a group of 
human rights experts expressed concern over it, stating, “We believe the agreement between 
Japan and South Korea falls short of meeting the demands of survivors,” going further to state 
that, “[a]n unequivocal official apology recognizing the full responsibility of the then Japanese 
Government and military, as well as adequate reparations, would protect and uphold the victims’ 
right to truth, justice and reparation.”39  
                                                   
38 Choi Hye Ryeon and Han Seung Hoon interview. June 2017. 
39 Accessed at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=17209. 
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The activists were willing to thwart an agreement they felt was less than ideal. It shows 
that activists aims “require clear, powerful messages that appeal to shared principles, which often 
have more impact on state policy than advice of technical experts.”40 This moment is exactly 
what James C. Scott describes as the “hidden transcript” showing audiences the behind the 
scenes of the political theater. 
Control over the narrative is a very important factor for activist networks. As we will see 
later when we see where the term “comfort women” comes from. Activists networks and those in 
power that they are typically at odds with are both operating on two different narrative tracks. 
These two narratives are, according to Scott, the “public transcript” and the “hidden transcript.” 
States generally operate in the public transcript whereas activist networks are operating in the 
hidden transcript. “The theatrical imperatives that normally prevail in situations of domination 
produce a public transcript in close conformity with how the dominant group would wish to have 
things appear. The dominant never control the stage absolutely, but their wishes normally 
prevail.”41 Activism is taking the hidden transcript--eg what the powerless non-state actors 
actually believe and feel--and bringing it into view, showing “audiences” the behind the scenes 
of political theater. 
The “comfort women” network did this brilliantly during the 2015 agreement and took 
advantage of a moment to show how the Park Guen Hye administration was at odds with the 
general public over an issue. But when she was undergoing impeachment the activist network 
really struck, by dividing the incoming president Moon Jae In with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. 
As Scott notes, “The advantages of keeping discord out of sight are obvious enough. If the 
dominant are at odds with one another in any substantial way, they are, to that degree, weakened, 
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and subordinates may be able to exploit the divisions and renegotiate the terms of 
subordination.”42 In the context of the above quote we can think of subordination as the 
powerlessness of the activists and survivors to influence a bilateral agreement, but then the 
activists found a small gap and quickly shoved a wedge between the two governments. 
For hidden transcript discourse to occur, according to Scott, it must take place in 
“offstage social spaces” where the subordinate groups are free from control from authorities or 
those in power. These spaces are typically public gatherings such as cafes, bars, public parks, 
friends houses, and so on. Amazingly the activists who protect the Sonyeosang statue have found 
a way to create an offstage social space in plain view. The camp they erected outside of the 
Japanese embassy is both completely legal so they cannot be forced to leave and completely 
insulated so that they may carry on their opposing discourses and action planning with their 
members. This is where activism is actually most effective, in these hidden transcripts since, “the 
hidden transcript has no reality as pure thought; it exists only to the extent it is practiced, 
articulated, enacted, and disseminated within these offstage social sites...the social spaces where 
the hidden transcript grows are themselves an achievement of resistance they are won and 
defended in the teeth of power.”43 The place where the hidden transcript can be seen in full view 
is the Wednesday protest, where anyone interested in this issue may come and speak in front of 
an audience of others. These demonstrations rouse the base and energize people to commit to the 
activist network in some way. 
One of the main tactics during these demonstrations is storytelling, an important strategy 
for activist networks. According the Keck and Sikkink the information coming from activists 
through storytelling must be well documented, credible, and timely with the flare of drama. 
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These are key concepts to employ when trying to persuade the minds of public policy makers 
and civil society.44 There are many stories told in the “comfort women” network. The main story 
that gets recounted over and over are the stories of the survivors. In a society that reveres the 
elderly it is doubly impactful to tell their stories to the youth who will make up most of the rank 
and file of the activist networks. They take such stories to heart and it empowers them toward 
action, as Han Seung Hoon told me during an interviewing while protecting the Sonyeosang 
statue, “Those grandmothers are being so brave and a young man like myself wasn’t doing 
anything. That didn’t feel quite right. I felt like I could do something. I come [to this protest], 
because I know just standing here together can make a difference. And this is much more than a 
conflict between Korea and Japan. It’s about human rights worldwide.”45 
 Keck and Sikkink point out that networks don’t just use facts and testimony and evidence 
they have gathered as raw facts in an attempt to change minds. It is actually widely known that 
people will not respond well to direct information and may even shut it out. What is necessary is 
weaving this information into a story, something painted vividly in the mind of an interlocutor.  
Activists bring attention to an issue by using dramatic language with facts, “dramatizing 
the situations of the victims and turning the cold facts into human stories, intended to move 
people to action.”46  Consider the terms “comfort women” and “sex slaves.” In a bout of control 
over the narrative, the Japanese government began calling the survivors of sexual slavery 
“comfort women” in an attempt to soften the dialogue around the issue. The activists, very 
strategically, shifted the issue of “comfort women” from a historical issue between South Korea 
and Japan (and the many other neighboring countries that Japan colonized) to one of present 
importance, a fight over human rights and more specifically women’s rights. Later I will discuss 
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the legality over the legal terms involved in this case study within the United Nations but it is 
important to note that taking the conversation into the arena of human rights allowed the activists 
to use such legal terms as “sex slaves” or “sexual violence” which in turn became problematic 
for Japan considering international law and Japan’s obligations to treaty bodies specifically 
CEDAW. 
 What activist networks do, and have legitimized in the eyes of law and policy makers is 
combined testimonials, the stories of survivors and victims, with technical, statistical, and 
historical information. Without linking these two concepts, the abstract with the concrete, 
activists tend to have a much harder time creating change in policies and in minds. In fact 
information is the golden egg for activist networks. Not only is information essential but 
activists, “depend on their access to information to help make them legitimate players. Contact 
with like-minded groups at home and abroad provide access to information necessary to their 
work, broadens their legitimacy, and helps to mobilize information around particular policy 
targets.”47 To broadcast this information activist networks rely heavily on traditional media 
outlets by organizing major events to attract them (erecting statues, holding demonstrations, 
etcetera) but also through the social media space on the internet as well as original content 
creators, such as documentaries, writers, and artists. All of these facilitators of information are 
crucial for what Keck and Sikkink call Symbolic Politics. 
 For activists networks to succeed they must tap into “powerful symbolic events,” 
identifying and explaining the importance of them, to convince and persuade global civil society 
so that the networks themselves can expand and enter into the collective consciousness the issues 
that they are fighting for.48 Symbolic events vary from issue to issue and they are not always pre-
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planned by activist networks but are capitalized on very quickly. They typically arise out of stark 
juxtapositions with situations of the moment, an example being the 1960’s United States civil 
rights movement capitalizing on the world’s image of the United States, which at the time was 
promoting democracy and the freedoms that come with it against communism. The civil rights 
movement used the media (and information politics) to broadcast the brutal police crackdowns 
on non-violent protests and the overt racism rampant throughout the United States to the rest of 
the world. It was then hard to take the United States’ word that it was truly a just and peaceful 
country that should be emulated while the civil rights movement was capitalizing on these 
moments, in an attempt to hold a mirror up to policy makers. 
 There are two events that the “comfort women” activists rely on which operate in a sort 
of cyclical flow of symbolism. The primary mover for the movement was first the testimony of 
Kim Hak Sun, which formed the first ever demonstration outside of the Japanese embassy in 
Seoul, South Korea. This demonstration, the “Wednesday Demonstration,” has become the 
world’s longest running protest.49 Its functions as an event is to focus on the ongoing issue and 
the status of it, but is also a backdrop for the activist network to expand its membership and to 
forge the activist fire in participants to help in their own way. 
 The second event is the creation and installing of statues both domestically in South 
Korea and internationally, in countries such as China, Australia, Germany, Canada, and the 
United States. The most significant aspect of this event is the achievement of growth for the 
activist network, especially so when a statue is installed internationally. It is a torch in the 
distance that there are more people committed to fighting for human rights, past and present, and 
that local policy makers of foreign countries are framing the issue as an international one. 
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 The cyclical symbolism is apparent if one considers the meaning of the Sonyeosang 
statue specifically, and also the ones inspired by the original. The typical statue is installed as a 
way to draw attention to the past, a constant reminder. The Sonyeosang statue is different in that 
it does memorialize the past, but its main function is to demand something from the present for 
the future. The demands of the survivors are embodied in the statue. It creates a space, in the 
public, for which activists can congregate but even in-lieu of physical bodies the statue is in itself 
an activist piece--for as long as this issue goes unresolved. 
 When viewers look at these statues they are prompted to figure out the meaning. Once 
they learn about the intentions behind them, the issues they represent, and that there still is no 
conclusion it is safe to say some will turn to the cause and join the network. Those that join the 
network will typically join the Wednesday Protests completing the circle. With the expansion of 
the activist network, they are able to use their international network and presence to pressure 
their foreign representatives to address these issues on the international stage. It is in the 
international arena, where the responsible party is often signatory to some treaty or party to 
international agreements, that the activist network can apply pressure on a government that has 
publically committed itself to an ideal or principle. Exposing the distance between what the 
government says and what it actually practices is, as Keck and Sikkink point out, “embarrassing 
to many governments, which may try to save face by closing that distance.”50 This tactic is know 
as Accountability Politics.  
 One of the most effective methods for activist networks against states or transnational 
private organizations is, essentially, the method of shaming. Many states (and even many 
companies) loosely express sympathy and alliance to higher ideals like human rights, 
environmental protection, and so on. States, however, will sign treaties or publically commit 
                                                   
50 Keck, Ibid., 24. 
 27 
themselves to certain principles and it is here that the activist networks can use this and the 
information politics they are armed with to, “expose the distance between discourse and 
practice.”51 As Japan is signatory to a few treaties that may be invoked here, the most potent one 
is the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW). They signed the treaty on July 17th, 1980, and ratified it on June 25th, 1985.52 It is 
within the forum of CEDAW that Japan is pressured to respond to, as well as solve, the issue of 
wartime sex slavery. The activist network, influencing policy makers and political elites, are able 
to expose Japan’s words and actions as if operating from completely separate bodies. 
 Accountability politics are very powerful and, oddly enough, typically handed to activist 
networks because of state hubris. States probably do wish to incorporate human rights ideals and 
truly mean to work on becoming morally and ethically better, but as is always the case they want 
to do it on their own time and at their own pace. If activist networks are good for one thing, it is 
lighting a fire under acquiescence to encourage momentum for change. 
Are activist networks truly influential? Throwing international relations theories aside it 
is possible to gauge the influence an activist network may have on achieving their missions. To 
see the influence one must run through their operations from the beginning. Networks engage in 
issue creation and agenda setting, where they bring to the public consciousness awareness of a 
specific issue by engaging with the media, making things a matter of public debate, setting up 
meetings with officials and policy crafters to turn them into supporters, and so on. This would 
mean that activist networks are influencing discursive politics at the state level which is then 
represented in international settings, which in turn dissiminates into more changes on more state 
levels. This happens when the “targets” of activist networks change institutional procedure--for 
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the comfort women issue, activists changed their angle from an unresolved historical issue to an 
ongoing human rights issue involving sexual slavery, as the women are still alive and still have 
not received satisfaction which changed the procedure on how to handle this issue. Then these 
procedural changes begin to affect policy decisions not just in the international forum but at the 
state level too.53 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY ON ADVOCACY / THE DOCUMENTARY FILM 
On January 8th, 1992, the first protest for South Korean victims was held outside of the 
Japanese embassy in Seoul, South Korea calling on then Prime Minister of Japan Kiichi 
Miyazawa to acknowledge the war crimes committed by the Japanese empire, reveal the truth 
about crimes of military sexual slavery, make an official apology by the Japanese government (a 
vote from the diet), legal reparations, and punish those responsible for the crimes. Since that day, 
and every Wednesday after, which gave the protest the name “the Wednesday Demonstration,” 
there has been a protest outside of the Japanese embassy. And since that day the Japanese 
government has actively denied the claims made by the victims and has sought a revisionist 
approach to history regarding its crimes committed during World War II. This revisionism and 
denial has been met with condemnation by many United Nations bodies, the most recent coming 
from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in October, 2017. 
 On December 14th, 2011, in commemoration of the 1000th Wednesday demonstration 
two artists installed and unveiled a bronze statue of a little Korean girl. She is seated next to an 
empty chair (an invitation to sit with her), and gazes--rather fiercely-- straight ahead; with 
clenched fists and raised heels she looks strong willed for her age, which is roughly 15 years old, 
almost like she is the only adult in the space. Directly in front of her, across a two-car-laned 
street is the Japanese embassy in Seoul. Originally she was meant to be a memorial plaque no 
bigger than a piece of A4 paper, however when the Japanese government caught wind of the 
project they openly chastised it and demanded that the memorial not be setup. The artists, Kim 
Seo-kyung and her husband, Kim Eun-sung, balked at the idea and reaching deep inside 
themselves created the statue that is known ubiquitously in Korea as, “Sonyeosang,” or “statue of 
the little girl” (from here on it will be referred to as Sonyeosang). 
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 This bronze statue has become an issue in and of itself, despite the whole reason it was 
set up which was to memorialize and celebrate the continuing fight by the Korean survivors for 
justice and wartime reparations. It has sunk trade deals between Japan and South Korea and, 
because of the ingenuity of grassroots activists, stalled the 2015 agreement between Japan and 
South Korea which if implemented called for the removal of Sonyeosang from outside of the 
Japanese embassy. The 2015 agreement was unanimously denounced by a panel of UN human 
rights experts in 2016 where they stated that they,  
believe the agreement between Japan and South Korea falls short of meeting the 
demands of survivors… Neither the surviving victims nor the organizations 
representing them for more than 20 years were consulted in the preparation of this 
agreement...This undermines decades of activism and efforts to seek truth and 
justice and naturally leaves the survivors in considerable distress… We are also 
deeply concerned that the Republic of Korea may remove a statue 
commemorating not only the historical issue and legacy of the ‘comfort women’ 
but also symbolizing the survivors’ long search for justice”54 [emphasis mine].  
The agreement has been left in political limbo since the impeachment of Park Guen-hye, whose 
administration brokered the deal. With her ouster the incoming and current President, Moon Jae-
in, halted any implementation process and conducted a thorough review of the deal citing the 
disapproval by South Korean citizens over the agreement. 
Not waiting for a decision from the government, activists upon hearing about the 
agreement descended upon Sonyeosang, surrounded her, and have not let her out of their 24-hour 
gaze ever since. In 2017, for the month of June, I spent time filming with and observing these 
activists and their protest. They are committed to protecting the statue at all costs, one activist 
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whose last name is Seo said, if “they” came to take Sonyeosang away she would throw her own 
body on to it to stop them. 
The group, they call themselves “guards,” is unique to this issue because they operate 
outside of the formal network that is set up to handle the activism and handling of the “comfort 
women” issue. The formal organization’s name is the Korean Council for the Women Drafted 
for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan. This organization is responsible to providing housing and 
general care to the surviving victims. They are also the main organizers of the Wednesday 
protest and much of the transnational activism around this issue. A rather good question comes 
up, why were the cameras not pointed at them? This is very simple to answer, because they 
would not exist if it were not for activists like the “guards.”  
To use a military term, activists networks are only as strong as their “boots on the 
ground.” And the boots that stand next to the Sonyeosang statue are among the strongest parts of 
this network because they perform actions that James C. Scott has termed as the “weapons of the 
weak.” They perform everyday forms of resistance that the state isn’t able to fully respond to 
since they are organized in such an informal way. That informalness is a key reason why, but 
also it is because they are not restrained by any sort of political processes. As James C. Scott 
noted, “institutionalized politics is formal, overt, concerned with systematic, de jure change, 
everyday resistance is informal, often covert, and concerned largely with immediate, de facto 
gains.”55 To put it simply, the main organization is formalized in that they must go through the 
red tape of bureaucracy in order to maintain legal and political wins, essentially become the 
system to fight the system. The statue guards are informal in that they operate only for their 
immediate gains, which are to save Sonyeosang from removal and stop the 2015 agreement from 
being implemented. The have no desire to be a formal entity that can be negotiated with in 
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formal political avenues; even if it came to that their structure is non-hierarchical. Each guard is 
as important and deserving as the next and everyone conforms to agreed upon rules that are fluid 
in a democratic sense. There is a “lead activist”, her name is Choi Hye Ryeon, but she is more of 
a facilitator who took responsibility for the smooth operation of the activist protest, getting 
needed supplies, tending to social media, running protests and meetings. When she leaves, 
someone else with the desire to do those tasks will take her place if the others decide. To 
illustrate what I mean by everyday forms of resistance that a state cannot penetrate here is a story 
of Choi Hye Ryeon just a few days before I left South Korea. 
The local government of Jongno-gu in Seoul passed legislation saying they would not 
remove the statue from its location. Choi received a phone call from the local police--she is a 
known activist around Seoul, so they have her cell phone number--they told her about the new 
local legislation and suggested that she and everyone else pack the protest up and head home for 
some rest, they had won. Choi, being politically savvy and knowing the national government has 
the final say in this matter, responded by saying, “Thank you for the concern, but we are not 
going anywhere.” and the phone call ended.56 She acted alone but she acted with the knowledge 
that every single one of her compatriots would have done the exact same thing.  
There was no internal meeting held, no superior to refer to, and no organizational 
processes to follow. The guards are there for very specific reasons and those reasons do not 
waiver for politics or diplomacy, because they don’t need to. The other important aspect of the 
guards is that they are a human connection to passersby and the inquisitive. Pitched next to 
Sonyeosang is a cobbled together tent made of old plastic shipping pallets, foam padding, some 
foldable mats, a beach umbrella and a see-through plastic tarp. This spectacle is hard to ignore 
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and when one passes by and does not see a typical house less person but a young 20-something 
working on a laptop or scrolling through their phone it gives pause and encourages conversation. 
From there they can explain the situation between the South Korean and Japanese governments, 
run through the historical narrative of the survivors’ testimonies (a necessity for successful 
transnational activists according to Keck and Sikkink)57, and encourage those seeking to join in 
on some good wholesome protesting. 
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CHAPTER SIX: LEVERAGE - LEGAL, MORAL, IOs, FRAMEWORKS 
 To manifest policy change activist networks have to gain leverage in order to change the 
hearts and minds of policy makers. From there they can use their leverage to influence more 
powerful actors as well as the domestic policies of their “target actors.”58 Leverage politics are 
dependent on the potency of their information politics. Activists must have a clear and concise 
body of material that gives them the moral high ground which they can use as leverage against 
their target actor, and use this information within more powerful institutions. This information 
comes from the network’s ability to mobilize its own members and drive the conversation--and 
to change opinions--through various public media outlets and social media. Human rights 
activists do this by organizing days of protest, holding rallies, appearing on news channels, 
creating or participating in documentary films, making provocative art works, and anything else 
to capture the public’s attention.  
 The “comfort women” activists are not unknown to rabble rousing, one of the most 
dramatic moments--besides placing a memorial across the street from the Japanese embassy in 
Seoul--was when they placed a statue in front of the Consulate in Busan, South Korea in 2017. 
This event, much reported on in Asia, resulted in the recalling of the Japanese consul general to 
Busan, Yasumasa Nagamine, from his post. The statue, though being protected by the bodies of 
activists, was eventually removed by police. After a mass demonstration it was then placed back 
in its original spot. Ambassador Nagamine eventually came back to his post but was followed by 
massive protest from the Japanese government. This action taken by some activists in South 
Korea follows the method laid out by Keck and Sikkink, where they used symbolic politics (the 
statue installation) to gain media attention and then using this as leverage to push the importance 
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of this issue both domestically and internationally with Japan. Because it became an international 
story Japan was forced to respond. 
 The “comfort women” issue brings into focus a debate over how to view international 
policy and law. These two views are the “state-centric paradigm” which focuses on state 
interactions and the “people-based paradigm” that views individuals regardless of national 
boundaries as the beneficiaries of the international system.59 The activist network had to deploy a 
counternarrative to that of the Japanese state. They used the “human rights discourse to 
undertake exercises of re-imagination, organize within spaces of ‘soft’ or semi formal-authority, 
and engage in a politics of rights.”60 This allowed them to maneuver in their limited capacity 
through the international human rights system to directly engage the Japanese government.  
 To understand the current and main framing of the “comfort women” issue, which is a 
human rights framework, we have to look at the history of the movement from the early ‘90s and 
also its journey through various legal cases all around the world. 
 There are various NGOs around this issue, the most notable in no specific order: the 
Korean Council for Women Drafted for Japanese Military Sexual Slavery (Korean Council), 
Violence Against Women in War-Network Japan, and the LILA-Pilipina. These NGOs are also a 
domestic force, working with survivors and lobbying their local and national governments on 
their behalf. 
 In the early 1990s Korean and Japanese researchers uncovered proof of Japan’s 
involvement in the creation of the comfort women system. Growing pressure in Japan over the 
issue forced a personal apology from Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in 1992. During 1992-
1993 the Japanese government issued fact-finding missions which they then admitted to having 
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involvement in the comfort women system. Then in 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono made 
an official apology on the government’s stationary. This is the notorious “Kono statement,” a 
statement that is used by both sides with the Japanese stating it is an apology and the South 
Koreans stating it is an admission of guilt but not an apology. However, at this point the 
invoking of the Kono statement has hit diminishing returns.61 
 International law and policy coming from international institutions at this point was 
undergoing a zeitgeist shift especially in the thinking of human rights. Following two major 
moments from two world powers, Germany apologizing for its role and heinous crimes before 
and during World War II, and the United States also issuing a formal apology for its internment 
of Japanese citizens during the war, it seemed the right time for Japan to follow suit with an 
apology, but they never did. Later the United Nations set up the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to prosecute war crimes and facilitate reconciliation. 
These “official U.N. activities fortified the emerging international norms that governments and 
leaders should be held accountable for their ‘crimes against humanity’ regardless of how long 
ago the crimes were committed.”62 
 The Korean Council, after sending delegates to the UN in August  1992 and February 
1993, asked for an investigation to be conducted by the “Sub-commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities” on violations of human rights during World War II. 
More NGOs requested similar investigations on forced labor as well as military sexual slavery. 
The UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
approved a resolution calling for a Special Rapporteur that would investigate systematic rape, 
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sexual slavery, and similar issues.63 In March 1994, the UN Human Rights Committee appointed 
a Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women , which became the first official investigation 
by the United Nations to look into the “comfort women” issue between South Korea and Japan 
(and other once colonized states). June the same year had the UN Working Group on 
Contemporary Forms of Slavery recommend that the “comfort women” issue be settled at the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague. The Korean Council suggested to the government 
of Japan that they should take the issue to the Permanent Court of Arbitration to see if Japan has 
any legal responsibility under international law. Almost half a year later in January 1995 the 
Japanese government sent an official rejection to the idea of arbitration through the court.64 
 In response to criticism of not handling this issue well enough, the government of Japan 
setup in 1995 the Asian Peace and Friendship Foundation for Women (or the Asian Women 
Fund), which is a private organization taking donations from the Japanese public in lieu of 
formal reparations to the survivors by the Japanese state. This move was rejected by the 
survivors and activists and was viewed by the international community as not being a true 
governmental apology as no apology was voted on and approved by the Japanese diet. 
 In 1996, the International Labour Organization Committee of Experts ruled that the 
Japanese violated the 1930 Convention Concerning Forced Labour by creating the comfort 
system.65 This undercut the Japanese argument that the women were not forced into sexual 
slavery but rather were drafted for the war effort (which boggles the mind how a draft is viewed 
as not forcing one into something). The ILO could not justify the application of article 2(d) 
which allows compulsory labor in the event of war or other calamities which threaten the safety 
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or wellbeing of the population,66 and in turn stated that, “involuntary labor must be restricted to 
those meeting the exigencies of the situation. Women’s sexual integrity and sexual autonomy 
may never be sacrificed in the name of emergency.”67 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women for the UN Human Rights 
Committee submitted their final report on the “comfort women” issue. The report is treated as 
the UN’s formal position toward the issue, which happens to be a mirror of the demands made by 
the survivors and the “comfort women” NGOs. It views Japan as the responsible party in 
violation under international law, that not only are the stories of the survivors and NGOs correct 
but Japan is responsible, “according to the law to make individual compensation to the victims 
and establish a ‘Special Administrative Tribunal’ to settle these unresolved cases.”68 The report 
goes on to, amazingly, suggest that victims and survivors ought to continue their pressure on the 
UN and also take this issue to the International Court of Justice. 
 At this point more former “comfort women” were coming out with their stories which in 
turn increased international pressure on Japan to act. The UN had already concluded that Japan 
was in violation of international law for past actions. However Japan, and to an extent the South 
Korean government, have dragged the issue out longer than has been needed. The activist 
network decided to shift their framing of the issue to circumvent even more the defense of the 
nation state and use the new framework as leverage to get the full weight of the international 
system to lean in on the issue. “Political opportunity theorists observe how movements are most 
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likely to succeed when shifts in political structure make political institutions more accessible to 
the movement and its causes.”69 
 The “comfort women” movement shifted their framework from a purely nationalist 
perspective (seeing that over 80% of the comfort women during World War II were Korean 
women70) to a more human rights based approach. By framing arguments in human rights 
discourse and basing them in stories that persuade, movements are able to build on to their 
member base and increase solidarity with their members.71 They began to approach things along 
the lines of a people-based paradigm. The “abuses suffered by the ‘comfort women’ fell neatly 
within U.N. state responsibility provisions,” and a human rights discourse “that ascribes 
responsibility to states for human rights violations committed by state organs or actors under the 
cloak of state authority, was particularly well suited to constructing a narrative that clearly 
identified the Japanese state as a perpetrator.”72 Simply put, the human rights framework told the 
agonizing story of the “comfort women’s” many violations and pointed the finger directly at 
Japan as their violator, thus framing it in a legal sense.  
 With the issue beginning to take root in international forums some of the early strategies 
of the “comfort women” were many lawsuits against Japan through a multitude of courts, 
domestic and international. The activists attempted a lawsuit in the United States on September 
18th, 2000, using the Alien Tort Claims Act, for its forcible recruitment and use of women as sex 
slaves. This lawsuit failed for many geo-political and at the time political reasons.73 But, as 
referred to before, the approach to international law during the presidency of George W. Bush 
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was to take the view of a state-centric paradigm. Nine separate lawsuits have been litigated in 
Japanese courts, brought to them by Chinese, Taiwanese, Korean, and Filipino groups.74 In every 
case but one the Japanese courts chose the state-centric paradigm. In April 1998, a Japanese 
court ruled in favor of a Korean lawsuit that sought damages to three survivors. The ruling was 
later overturned by a higher court which stated that no constitutional violations occurred.75 But a 
brief win is still viewed as precedent. 
 In an amazing feat of organization, the activist network and many NGOs created the The 
Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery in Tokyo, 
Japan on December 8th, 2000. It was a mock trial that had invited many prominent international 
law practitioners and scholars. On the judicial bench “sat Gabrielle McDonald, the former 
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; Carmen Mari 
Argibay, a judge from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; Professor 
Christine Chinkin, an international law professor at the University of London; and Professor 
Willie Mutunga, the Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission.”76 The mock 
trial took 5 days and the judgment was more than two-hundred pages. The first half of the 
judgement was dedicated to individual criminal guilt and the second half was focused on the 
Japanese state. In the end responsibility was placed solely on Japan to provide rehabilitation, 
reparations, offer an apology, and secure victim satisfaction. 
 The most important part about this event was the ruling at the end. Not a binding 
judgement and more of a suggestion made by an ad hoc apparatus, the judgement is actually 
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valid to be used under formal law within the International Court of Justice. Article 38 of the 
ICJ’s statute refers to writings of eminent jurists as sources of international law.77 As much as 
the 2000 Women’s Tribunal seemed to be a public relations stunt, it actually allowed the activist 
network and the allied NGOs to partake in a bit of international legal and policy writing. 
 Once activists have the attention of a population they are able to move through the 
political process, slowly legitimizing their issues through government bodies. The “comfort 
women” activists do this quite well in democratic countries like the United States and the 
Netherlands. 
 In January 2007, the “comfort women” movement successfully campaigned for 
legislative victories at the national level of the U.S. House of Representatives, passing the U.S. 
House Resolution 121, which requested that the Japanese government do the following, 
“formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility… help to resolve 
recurring questions about the sincerity and status of prior statements… clearly and publicly 
refute” claims that the “comfort women” system did not exist, “educate current and future 
generations about this horrible crime… follow the recommendations of the international 
community.”78 
 Afterword it seemed the last few snowflakes fell which shifted the weight causing an 
avalanche. The lower house of the Dutch Parliament passed a similarly worded resolution in 
November of 2007 urging Japan to take full responsibility for its war crimes and to also update 
its history textbooks to reflect the crimes committed against women during World War II.79 At 
the same time the Canadian Parliament approved motion 291 which called on Japan to commit to 
                                                   
77 Accessed at http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute on April 4th, 2018. 
78 H.R. Res. 121, 110th Cong. (Jan. 31, 2007) 
79 Dutch Parliament Urges Japan to Compensate “Comfort Women,” PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, NOV 21, 2007 
http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/6306488.html 
 42 
its 1993 apology, refute any denials about the wartime sexual slavery system, acknowledge 
involvement, and issue a formal and sincere apology via the Japanese diet.80 The following 
month the European Union Parliament passed a resolution asking Japan to, “acknowledge, 
apologize, and accept historical and legal responsibility, in a clear and unequivocal manner… 
implement effective administrative mechanisms to provide reparations… remove existing 
obstacles to obtaining reparations before Japanese courts… refute publicly” any claims that the 
“comfort women” system never existed.81 
 By going through local governments the activist network is building more and more 
pressure for their issue to be heard at the state government levels since representatives become 
aware of their constituents wishes and bring it to the attention at the national level, then 
ultimately at the international level. Even more than that, the process of having legislative bodies 
repeatedly side with the “comfort women” activists’ cause builds an immense pressure on Japan 
to respond seriously. 
 However, with no motion from Japan to resolve the issue they began to maintain a stance 
that they had already completed their obligations and fulfilled their international legal duties. 
This prompted the “comfort women” movement in South Korea to commission a small 
monumental plaque to be placed outside of the Japanese embassy in 2011. Japan protested this 
action and in a response that was more driven by the artists who were to make the the small 
plaque than the activist network itself (and a Scott-esque move if I may say), they created the 
bronze statue that we have today of the young seated girl, Sonyeosang. This action cut both 
ways, it gave Japan something to fixate on during negotiations and in international forums as 
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something hostile to Japan (being so close to an embassy) but also hostile to Japanese people 
whereas it may promote prejudice towards them. It also gave the activist network a symbol 
which, much like a wildfire, spread across the globe within years. The same statue has been 
placed throughout South Korea over 50 times; it also lives in Shanghai, China and Wiesent, 
Germany and Glendale, California in the United States (as well as Southfield, Michigan) and 
Toronto, Canada as well as Sydney, Australia, with more on the way and new original statues 
inspired by Sonyeosang being installed as well. 
 In a moment that could not be helped pointing out, one of the artists, Kim Eun Sung said 
while I interviewed him, “There is an irony here… If Japan didn’t react that way, Sonyeosang 
may never had been created. And we may have stayed with our original plan, a small 
monument.”82 
The Japanese government lobbies local governments to halt the process of erecting 
monuments and they even went so far as to write an amicus curiae brief for a lawsuit against the 
city of Glendale, a lawsuit started by Koichi Mera, CEO of Global Alliance of Historical Truth 
(GAHT), stating that the statue being placed in Glendale would cause a prejudice against the 
people of Japan. Mr. Mera and GAHT are the antithesis to the “comfort women” activist 
network.  
I interviewed Koichi Mera who has been a long time advocate to remove the “comfort 
women” statues whereever they stand. He is also an advocate to remove the legal term “sexual 
slave” for the former “comfort women” that is being used in international and legal forums. His 
view is that no woman was forcibly recruited into sexual slavery during World War II. For him, 
the moment that Japan wrote the amicus curiae brief was the moment he witnessed his activism 
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holding an influence, “Finally, the Japanese government has decided to support our position, 
publically. And they are acting according to our way of thinking.”83 
From whatever side of an issue an activist network is operating, both are jockeying for 
moral leverage. It is, however, the side that can mobilize shame on their target actor best wins 
out, “insofar as networks can demonstrate that a state is violating international obligations or is 
not living up to its own claims, they hope to jeopardize its credit enough to motivate a change in 
policy or behavior.”84 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE POTENTIAL; CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The agreement made by the Park Geun Hye administration was largely a state-centered 
paradigm and the election of Moon Jae In brought in an administration that has viewed things in 
a more people-based paradigm. The existing 2015 agreement was just not a valued piece of 
policy for the new government, but it was also looked down upon by the UN Human Rights 
Commission for the same exact reason. It was not based with the people in mind.85 So where 
does that leave Japan and South Korea on fixing the issue over the “comfort women”? 
         The policy options that face Japan are well summed up by Sonya Kuki. According to her 
there are three of them. One, a collaboration between Tokyo and Seoul whereas Seoul acts as 
official representation of the victims. Two, arbitration by the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA) at The Hague. And three, the status quo.86 Options one and three have been attempted by 
the Japanese government and both have resulted in massive failures. The first option was 
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attempted a few times but most notably in 2015 between the Park Geun Hye and Shinzo Abe 
administrations but done in a way that left the victim’s voices out of negotiations by literally not 
discussing it with them (the state-centered paradigm frowned upon by the United Nations). The 
meat of the agreement was for Japan to take responsibilities and offer an apology and to offer 
one billion yen to a foundation that will work as support for the remaining victims. It was an 
agreement meant to solve this issue “finally and irreversibly.”87 The 2015 agreement has come to 
be a massive political failure and has fallen into political limbo because the activists and victims 
rejected it, but also a majority of the South Korean nation couldn’t accept it especially when Park 
Guen Hye was impeached on corruption charges. Option three has been the fall back option for 
Japan and has proven to only have negative impacts on economic, moral and ethical judgements, 
and broad international relations.  
 It can be argued that in the light of failed diplomatic negotiations, Japan is “duty bound” 
to enter into arbitration with South Korea to resolve the issue. This is spelled out in the 1965 
agreement to normalize relations between the two countries, specifically in Article 3.88 
         It is clear that international arbitration is the only possible route to conclude this rather 
drawn out story for justice. Nationalism in both countries is found to be way too high for any 
decisions to be made without a neutral arbiter. Japan is party to the PCA but has continued to 
reject recommendations to find a solution there. One can only speculate the reasons why they 
choose not to use the PCA. Some point to politics and Japan’s society. An apology becomes 
increasingly more difficult to get out of the Japanese government, “if Japanese society continues 
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to move in a conservative direction.”89 Others argue that an apology and full legal reparations 
would do the Japanese state a strategic benefit, especially if it seeks to commit itself to a 
leadership role in and throughout East Asia. 
 For some, justice will have to come from the work of the international community 
continually setting norms and elevating pressure on states to really think about human rights and 
reparations e.g. the General Assembly (GA) of the United Nations adopting the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in 
December 2015.90 The interesting aspect about the above resolution is the perspective in which it 
was written, from that of the victim. “Starting from the victim’s perspective nearly guarantees a 
set of Principles that better molds reparations to the diverse needs of victims, and enables repair 
for each individual situation of harm.”91 Though the GA can only make recommendations, they 
are a good litmus test for the international mood regarding certain issues, and the Japanese 
government--and by extension the South Korea government--should take notice sooner rather 
than later of this shift in attitude. 
The political chess game over the “comfort women” issue seems to be on the surface an 
exhausting affair, but it is a blessing in disguise. For one, the longer the issue is dragged out the 
more nuanced and precise future policy and law will become covering this specific human rights 
violation. For every dodge and weave that Japan makes to avoid responsibility is an opportunity 
to close off yet another means of escape, again strengthening policy and law for the future. By no 
means do I wish the issue to drag on much further, for no other reason than the dignity and 
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justice that is much deserved for the survivors, but a small part of what I witnessed during 
interviews and experienced in the field is that the survivors themselves are prepared to martyr 
themselves until the very end if it means that future women and girls are spared a similar fate. As 
Lee Yong Su said, one of the survivors told the Board of San Francisco when testifying for the 
installation of a “comfort women” memorial in the city, “the truth will come out, no matter 
what.” There is no doubt she is aware that she may not see an end to her fight but she knows an 
end will come sometime. “The magnitude of the movement is not lost on those standing at the 
front lines. As Cheah Wui Ling summarizes, “the ‘comfort women’ movement has grown from 
being an isolated group of lone survivors and concerned historians into a transnational movement 
skilled in both grassroots organizing and institutional-maneuvering.”92 
And that is the true meaning and the real power behind the Sonyeosang statue. It is not 
just the rallying point for non-state activists to express the hidden transcript and fight for their 
vision of a just society, but it is that the statue has come to embody it all: the activists, the chants 
of the protestors, the stories of the survivors, the future hope for justice and equality in women 
and human rights. All of that sits in the mild mannered expression of a young girl, seated next to 
an empty chair and made of bronze. As Sarah Vartabedian put it, “Because the act of witnessing 
demands that the body authoritatively communicates its experiences, but the credibility of that 
body is called into question when exposed to sexual violence, the ‘Statue of Peace’ becomes the 
objective performative proxy able to withstand the demands of witnessing and exhibits… 
‘embodied rhetorical agency.’” The statue has become, in an almost anthropomorphic way, the 
witness of a history that is created everyday. That is what Japan fears most about the statue being 
placed internationally--when a viewer crosses its path they will invariably learn what the statue 
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has come to “know.” Which in turn--and this is the most fascinating thing about Sonyeosang--
will make the viewer turn from ignorant to witness as well (if not full on ally). 
The statue embodies a long struggle that Kelly Askin summarizes, which I will quote at 
length because of the palpable rage from an understandable position of indignation for a slow 
moving through, at times, toothless political and legal systems: 
The former ‘comfort women’ were victimized by their brutal assaulters, by the 
Japanese government, military personnel, and private parties responsible for or 
benefiting from the system; they were victimized by their family or community 
who wrongfully considered the survivors defiled and shamed, and treated them 
with disdain, cruelty, or mere indifference; they were victimized by the Allied 
nations prosecuting crimes in the IMTFE but which failed to include the sexual 
slavery; they were victimized by their own countries which ignored, covered up, 
or otherwise failed to acknowledge or redress the assaults; they were victimized 
by their religions which often treated them as dirty or impure; they were 
victimized by local or regional judicial systems, which failed to prosecute or 
compensate for the crimes; and they were victimized by the international 
community, including the United Nations, which has failed to provide adequate 
protection against, investigation or acknowledgment of, and redress for these 
gross violations, and has failed to insist that the Japanese government take full 
responsibility for their crimes.93 
The activists protecting the statue are in a way protecting the most valuable witness in their fight, 
they are protecting truth and history and the future and at the same time drawing attention to the 
issue with events like, well, protecting the statue from removal. They are the reason at the atomic 
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level of Keck and Sikkink’s theoretical framework to why activists networks work and succeed. 
They are devoid of hierarchical restrictions in their speech and their views and which direction 
they desire to take their fight. Their actions allow formal NGOs to operate on an elevated 
platform, in polite and diplomatic fashions, knowing they have a network of activists to rely on 
for pressure when the time comes for policy demands or pressure on target actors. The target 
actors, from local politicians to diplomats serving in the United Nations or other international 
forums, are then inspired by testimonials that commingle with facts lead them to turn into allies 
fighting for their cause at the highest levels. When the highest levels decide on policy or law 
which causes domestic politics to adapt or adopt these new norms, Keck and Sikkink call this the 
“boomerang effect.” Activists are metaphorically “throwing” their issue out into the world to 
have it come back to them in some way. 
Though it is easier to compartmentalize complex things, such as activist networks and 
international law and policy changes,  I think the system at play here is better summed up by 
James C. Scott,  
 
Revolutions and social movements are, then, typically confected by a plurality of 
actors: actors with wildly divergent objectives mixed with a large dose of rage 
and indignation, actors with little knowledge of the situation beyond their 
immediate ken, actors subject to chance occurrences (a rain shower, a rumor, a 
gunshot)--and yet the vector sum of this cacophony of events may set the stage for 
what later is seen as a revolution. They are rarely, if ever, the work of coherent 
organizations directing their “troops” to a determined objective…94 
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The one thing I would add to Scott’s summary of actors is a statue of a young girl made of 
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Figure 2. Choi Hye-ryeon (seated) and Han Seung-hoon (standing) having the morning photo taken by another 




Figure 3. One of the survivors of forced sexual slavery, Lee Yong Soo, stands next to a monument by sculptor 
Steven Whyte installed in San Francisco. 
 
 
Figure 4. The second half of the San Francisco monument. These three girls, which are the three major ethnicities 
forced into sexual slavery by Japan--South Korean, Chinese, and Filipino--are viewed by the Grandma figure above. 
 
